Abstract-We consider the problem of distributed convergence to efficient outcomes in coordination games through payoff-based learning dynamics, namely aspiration learning. The proposed learning scheme assumes that players reinforce well performed actions, by successively playing these actions, otherwise they randomize among alternative actions. Our first contribution is the characterization of the asymptotic behavior of the induced Markov chain of the iterated process by an equivalent finite-state Markov chain, which simplifies previously introduced analysis on aspiration learning. We then characterize explicitly the behavior of the proposed aspiration learning in a generalized version of so-called coordination games, an example of which is network formation games. In particular, we show that in coordination games the expected percentage of time that the efficient action profile is played can become arbitrarily large.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed coordination is of particular interest in many engineering systems. A few examples include distributed overlay routing [1] and topology control [2] in wireless communications. In either case, nodes need to utilize their resources efficiently so that a global objective is achieved. In these scenarios, expected utility maximization (or best reply) by each agent is not often feasible in terms of information or formulation of beliefs about other agents' actions.
To this end, this paper is concerned about a form of distributed learning dynamics, namely aspiration learning, where agents "satisfice" rather than "optimize". The aspiration learning scheme is based on a simple principle of "win-stay, lose-shift" [3] , according to which a successful action is repeated while an unsuccessful action is dropped. The success of an action is usually determined by a simple comparison test of its prior performance with the player's desirable return (aspiration level). The aspiration level is updated to incorporate prior experience into the agent's success criterion.
The history of aspiration learning schemes starts with the pioneering work of [4] , where satisfaction-seeking behavior used to explain social decision making. A simple aspiration learning model is presented in [3] , where games of two players and two actions are considered, decisions are taken based on the "win-stay, lose-shift" rule and the success of a selected action is based on a simple comparison between the payoff received and an aspiration level.
The difficulty of the aspiration learning schemes lies in the analysis of their convergence behavior. To simplify the analysis several schemes consider an aspiration update which is slower than the action update [5] . In the case of synchronous aspiration and action update, [6] and [7] show that the Pareto-dominant state is selected with probability close to one on mutual interest games and symmetric coordination games of two players and two actions, respectively. Similar are the results in [8] , [9] . However, contrary to [6] and [7] , both models incorporate a small perturbation either in the aspiration update [8] or in the action update [9] . An aspiration learning scheme in games of multiple players and actions is also presented in [10] , where aspiration level is updated similarly to the update rule of [3] . It is shown that a Nash equilibrium will be selected with probability arbitrarily close to one in weakly acyclic games.
In this paper, we are going to focus on games of large number of players and actions, where players apply an aspiration learning scheme similar to the one introduced in [8] . Our goal here is to characterize explicitly the asymptotic behavior of the learning process, and derive conditions under which "efficient" outcomes are selected. Our first contribution is the characterization of the asymptotic behavior of the induced Markov chain by an equivalent finite-state Markov chain, which extends prior analysis to games of multiple players and actions. We also characterize the asymptotic behavior in a class of games which is a generalized version of so-called coordination games. It will be shown that, in these games, the expected percentage of time that the learning process spends at the payoff-dominant profiles can become arbitrarily large when the experimentation probability becomes sufficiently small. We finally demonstrate the applicability of the learning scheme to a network formation game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II defines coordination games and presents an example in network formation. Section III presents the aspiration learning algorithm and its convergence properties in games of multiple players and actions. Section IV specializes the convergence results in coordination games. The results are illustrated through simulations in a network formation game. Finally, Section V presents concluding remarks.
Terminology: We consider the standard setup of finite strategic form games. There is a finite set of agents, I = {1, 2, ..., n}, and each agent has a finite number of actions, denoted by A i . The set of action profiles is the cartesian product A A 1 × ... × A n ; α i ∈ A i denotes an action of agent i; and α = (α 1 , ..., α n ) ∈ A denotes an action profile of all agents. The payoff/utility function of player i is a mapping u i : A → R. An action profile α * ∈ A is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if
for all i ∈ I and α ′ i ∈ A i , where −i denotes the complementary set I\{i}. We will denote the set of pure Nash equilibria by A * . Finally, define the set of payoff-dominant action profiles, denoted by A, as follows:
II. COORDINATION GAMES A. Definition
Before defining coordination games, we first need to define the notion of better reply: Definition 2.1 (Better reply): The better reply of agent i ∈ I to an action profile α = ( 1) for any α ∈ A and α / ∈ A, u i (α) > u i (α), ∀i ∈ I; 2) for any α ∈ A\A * , there exist i ∈ I such that BR i (α) = ∅, and action α
3) for any α * ∈ A * and agent j 1 ∈ I, there exists a sequence of distinct agents j 1 , ..., j n ∈ I, and actions α j ∈ A j , j = j 1 , ..., j n−1 , such that
for all i ∈ {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j ℓ+1 }, ℓ = 1, 2, ..., n − 1. We also define a (non-strict) coordination game as a game which satisfies all conditions of Definition 2.2 but Condition 1.
The conditions of a coordination game establish a weak form of "coincidence of interests" and define a larger class of games than the games traditionally considered as coordination games, e.g., [11] , [12] . For example, Condition 2 implies that there exist an agent i and a better reply for i which keeps everyone satisfied. Also, Condition 3 implies that, for any Nash equilibrium profile, there exists a sequence of agents and actions that can reduce everyone's payoff below their equilibrium payoff.
A trivial example of a strict coordination game is the StagHunt Game of Table I . First, there exists a payoff-dominant profile that satisfies Condition 1 of Definition 2.2. Also, from any non-equilibrium profile, there is a better reply that improves the payoff for all agents (i.e., Condition 2 holds). Finally, for either one of the Nash equilibrium profiles, (A, A) or (B, B), there is a player (row or column) and an action which makes everyone's payoff less than the equilibrium payoff (i.e., Condition 3 holds). 
) for some i, terminates at a Nash equilibrium.
Note that a direct consequence of Claim 2.1 is that coordination games are weakly acyclic games (cf., [13] ). Another straightforward observation is that:
Claim 2.2: In any coordination game A ⊆ A * . In other words, the set of payoff-dominant action profiles is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria.
B. Network formation example
To illustrate the applicability of coordination games, we consider a simple network formation game of n nodes and assume that the set of actions of each agent i, A i , contains all possible combinations of neighbors of i, denoted N i , with which a link can be established, i.e., A i = 2
Ni . Links are considered unidirectional, and a link established by node i with node s, denoted (s, i), starts at s with the arrowhead pointing to i. A graph G will then be defined as a collection of nodes and directed links. Define also the path from s to i as a sequence of nodes and directed links that starts at s and ends to i following the orientation of the graph, i.e.,
for some positive integer m. In a connected graph, there is a path from any node to any other node.
Let us consider the utility function u i : A → R, i ∈ I, as:
where |α i | denotes the number of links corresponding to action α i and κ 0 is a constant in (0, 1). Also,
where G α denotes the graph induced by joint action α. The resulting Nash equilibria are usually called Nash networks [14] . As it was shown in Proposition 4.2 in [15] , any Nash network G is critically connected, i.e., i) it is connected, and ii) for any (s, i) ∈ G, (s, i) is the unique path from s to i. For example, the resulting Nash networks for n = 3 agents and unconstrained neighborhoods are shown in Fig. 1 . Note that payoff-dominant networks (if exist) are connected with minimum number of links. Also, not all Nash networks are payoff-dominant, e.g., the network of Fig. 1(a) payoff-dominates the network of Fig. 1(b) . The utility function (2) corresponds to the connections model of [16] and has been used to describe various economic and social contexts such as transmission of information. It has also been applied for distributed topology control in wireless networks [2] .
It is straightforward to check that:
Claim 2.3: The network formation game defined by (2) is a (non-strict) coordination game if the set of payoff-dominant networks is non-empty.
The condition that payoff-dominant networks exist is not restrictive. For example, if N i = I\{i} for all i, then there exists a unique payoff-dominant network, namely the wheel network, cf. [15] .
III. ASPIRATION LEARNING
In this section we define aspiration learning, based on [8] . For some constants ζ > 0, ǫ > 0, λ ≥ 0, c > 0, 0 < h < 1, and ρ, ρ ∈ R, such that
the aspiration learning iteration initialized at (α(0), ρ(0)) is described by Table II . According to this algorithm, each agent i keeps track of an aspiration level, ρ i , which measures player i's desirable return and is defined as a discounted running average of its payoffs throughout the history of play. Given the current aspiration level, ρ i (t), agent i selects a new action α i (t + 1). If the previous action, α i , provided utility higher than ρ i (t), then agent i is "satisfied" and selects the same action, α i (t + 1) = α i . Otherwise, the new action is selected randomly over all available actions, where the probability of selecting again α i depends on the level of discontent measured by the difference u i (α) − ρ i (t) < 0.
In the remainder of the section, we will analyze the convergence properties of aspiration learning which is summarized in Theorem 3.1.
A. Notation and terminology
Define the state-space as X A × [ρ, ρ] n , i.e., pairs of i) joint actions α and ii) vectors of aspiration levels, ρ i , i ∈ I.
The following notation is standard, e.g., [17] . − B(X ): the Borel σ-algebra on X . − C(X ): the Banach space of real-valued continuous functions on X under the sup-norm (denoted by · ∞ ) topology. − M(X ): the space of finite-signed measures on X under the topology of weak convergence.
At any instance t = 0, 1, ..., 1) Agent i plays αi(t) = αi and measures utility ui(α).
2) Agent i updates its aspiration level according to
where
3) Agent i updates its action: − For f ∈ C(X ) and µ ∈ M(X ), define
Under this notation, µ n converges weakly to µ 0 , denoted µ n ⇒ µ 0 , if for all f ∈ C(X ),
. − P(X ): the subset of M(X ) of probability measures on X , i.e., for µ ∈ P(X ), i) µ(X ) = 1 and ii) µ(B) ≥ 0 for all B ∈ B(X ). − T : X × B(X ) → [0, 1] is a transition probability function if i) T (x, ·) ∈ P(X ) for all x ∈ X and ii) T (·, B) is measurable on X for all B ∈ B(X ). − For f ∈ C(X ), and transition probability function, T ,
− For µ ∈ P(X ) and transition probability function T , µT ∈ P(X ) is the probability measure defined by
− µ ∈ P(X ) is an invariant measure for the transition probability function T if µ = µT . − For transition probability functions T 1 and T 2 , the transition probability function T 1 T 2 is defined by
i.e., for B ∈ B(X ),
− 1 B : the indicator function of the set B,
− ∂B: the boundary of the set B.
B. Limiting invariant measure and ergodicity
We are interested in the asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning dynamics as the experimentation probability λ approaches zero.
Aspiration learning defines an X -valued Markov chain. Let P λ (x, ·) denote the corresponding transition probability function. We will refer to this process with λ > 0 as the perturbed process.
The analysis of the asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning will be related to the following class of states:
Definition 3.1 (Pure strategy state): A pure strategy state is a state x = (α, ρ) ∈ X such that for all i ∈ I, u i (α) = ρ i . The set of pure strategy states will be denoted by S with cardinality |S|. Note also that the set S is isomorphic to A and can be identified as such.
The main result of the paper is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 (Limiting invariant measure and ergodicity):
1) For λ > 0, P λ admits an invariant probability measure, µ λ . 2) There exists a unique vector π = [π s ], with π s ≥ 0, s ∈ S, and s∈S π s = 1, such that every weak limit point µ of a sequence of invariant probability measures, µ λ , of P λ , as λ ↓ 0 satisfieŝ
3) For λ > 0 and for every f ∈ L 1 (µ λ ),
for µ λ -a.e. x ∈ X . Furthermore, for every B ∈ B(X ) such that ∂B ∩ S = ∅, we have
The importance of this theorem lies on the fact that it relates the asymptotic behavior of the perturbed aspiration learning with the unique invariant distribution, π, of a finitestate Markov chain. The characterization of π will also be provided through the proof of the second claim. The third claim also provides the expected time average behavior of aspiration learning as λ → 0 and t → ∞ in relation to the limiting invariant measureμ and therefore π.
C. Proof of Theorem 3.1
The transition probability function P λ satisfies the weak Feller property, i.e., f ∈ C(X ) implies P λ f ∈ C(X ). Furthermore, X is a compact metric space. Therefore, P λ admits an invariant probability measure, µ λ , e.g., [17, Theorem 7.2.3] .
Equation (4) of the third claim is a direct consequence of Birkhoff's individual ergodic theorem, e.g., [17, Theorem 2.3.4] , and the fact that X is the only invariant set with respect to P λ .
1 Equation (5) is a direct consequence of Portmanteau's theorem due to the weak convergence of µ λ toμ and the fact that S is the support ofμ as (3) indicates.
It remains to show the second claim of Theorem 3.1. This will require a series of propositions the proofs of which have been omitted for the sake of brevity.
Let P (x, ·) denote the transition probability function for λ = 0. We will refer to this process as the unperturbed process. Let Ω X ∞ denote the canonical path space with an element ω ∈ Ω being a sequence {x(0), x(1), ...}, x(t) ∈ X generated by the unperturbed process. Define also the random variable ξ τ : Ω → X , such that ξ τ (ω) x(τ ) = (α(τ ), ρ(τ )). In several cases, we will abuse notation by writing x(τ ), or its components α(τ ) and ρ(τ ), instead of ξ τ (ω). Let, finally, P x denote the probability measure on the associated product σ-algebra initialized at x = (α, ρ).
Define the sequence of sets
Note that B t+1 ⊆ B t . Also, let B ∞ ∞ t=1 B t , which expresses the event that agents never change their actions.
Proposition 3.1 (Positive probability of stationarity):
The sequence {A t } is increasing, i.e., it satisfies A t ⊆ A t+1 . Let also A ∞ ∞ t=0 A t , which expresses the event that agents eventually play the same action profile.
Proposition 3.2 (Almost sure convergence):
Let P t denote the multistage transition probability function defined by the recursion P τ = P τ −1 P and
The following is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.3. Corollary 3.1: There exists a transition probability function, Π(x, ·), with support on S, such that, as t → ∞,
where ϕ(λ) ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0, and lim λ→0 ϕ(λ) = 0, then
We can express the transition probability function of the perturbed process as
where 0 < ϕ(λ) < 1 satisfies ϕ(λ) → 0 as λ → 0 and equals the probability that at least one agent trembles. Define the "lifted" transition probability function:
This transition probability function can be interpreted as an alternative representation of P λ . The evolution of P λ looks like trembles followed by periods of no trembles. The periods of no trembles have varying length, and so the dynamics involve periods of
is a weighted sum of such strings, with the weights being the probability of the associated string.
In a similar manner to P λ , we can write
where Q is the transition probability function induced by aspiration learning where exactly one player trembles, and Q * is the transition probability function where at least two players tremble simultaneously.
It turns out that P L λ from (7) and Π from Corollary 3.1 have a useful relationship for small λ.
Proposition 3.4: The following hold,
Let µ λ k be a sequence of invariant probability measures of P λ k with λ k → 0. If µ λ k ⇒μ, thenμ is an invariant probability measure of QΠ. For some s ∈ S define the sets
where (α s , ρ s ) denote the action and aspiration level of s. For any two pure strategy states, s, s ′ ∈ S, define alsô
for some ε > 0 sufficiently small. Given Proposition 3.2,P ss ′ is independent of the selection of ε. It can be interpreted as the probability that under the dynamics QP P... with initial condition s the process has been "captured" by s ′ , i.e., action α s ′ is being played repeatedly after some time t. Define also the matrixP [P ss ′ ]. 
for some constants π s ≥ 0, s ∈ S, such that π = [π s ] define an invariant distribution ofP .
IV. APPLICATION TO COORDINATION GAMES

A. Invariant measure
Let us define S and S * to be the set of pure strategy states corresponding to A and A * , respectively. Let us assume that π is an invariant distribution of the stochastic matrixP .
We are going to characterize the invariant distribution π with respect to the payoff-dominant pure strategy states and for step-size ǫ that approaches zero. To this end, we first need to compute the transition probability under the QP P... dynamics from a) a pure strategy state in S to a pure strategy state in S c , and b) a pure strategy state in S * \S to a pure strategy state in S. These transition probabilities are summarized in the followign two lemmas. 
B. Simulations in network formation
In this section, we demonstrate the asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning in coordination games as described by Theorems 3.1-4.1. Consider the network formation game of Section II-B which, according to Claim 2.3, is a (nonstrict) coordination game. Although Theorem 4.1 was only shown for strict coordination games, our intention here is to demonstrate that it also applies to the larger class of (nonstrict) coordination games.
To this end, we consider a set of six nodes deployed on the plane so that the neighbors of each node are the two immediate nodes (e.g., N 1 = {2, 6}). Note that in order for the average behavior to be observed λ and ǫ need to be sufficiently small. We choose: h = 0.01, c = 0.2, ζ = 0.01, ǫ = λ = 10e − 4, and κ 0 = 1/8. In Fig. 2 , we have plotted a typical response of aspiration learning for this setup, where we plotted the final graph and the aspiration level as a function of time. To illustrate better the response, define dist G (j, i) as the distance from node j to node i as the minimum number of hops from j to i. We admit the convention dist G (i, i) = 0 and dist G (j, i) = ∞ if there is no path from j to i in G. The final graph of Fig. 2 plots, for each node, the running average of the inverse of the sum of its distances from all other nodes, i.e., 1/ j∈I dist G (j, i). This number will be zero if the node is disconnected from another node. We observe that the payoff-dominant profile (wheel network) is played with frequency that approaches one. In fact, the aspiration level converges to (n − 1) − κ 0 = 4.875 and the inverse total distance converges to 1/15 = 0.067, both of which correspond to the wheel network.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced an aspiration learning algorithm and analyzed its asymptotic behavior in games of multiple players and actions. The main contribution of this analysis is the establishment of a relation between the time average behavior of the induced Markov chain with the invariant distribution of a finite-state Markov chain. We further characterized this invariant distribution in a large class of games, namely coordination games, and showed that it puts non-zero weight only on the payoff-dominant profiles. Finally, we demonstrated how aspiration learning can be implemented for distributed network formation, which is of independent interest.
